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JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this appeal
pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 63-46b-14 and 78-2-2(3)(e).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Issue: Does the state of Utah have taxing jurisdiction to assess and

collect income tax on non-residents who received income from a chose in action, by
litigating, in Nevada, claims of a fraud that occurred in California?
Standard of Review: The Administrative Procedures Act governs
judicial review of the Tax Commission's decisions interpreting statutory
law and the correction of error standard governs such review. The
reviewing court applies the least deferential correction-of-error standard
when reviewing questions of general statutory interpretation.
Neiderhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. v. Utah Tax Com'n,
Auditing Division, 858 P.2d 1034, 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), citing King
v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Thus, an appellate court grants no deference to an agency's interpretation
of a statute when the court is in as good a position as the agency to
interpret the general statutory provision in question, Nucor Steel Utah Div.
v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 832 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992).
2.

Issue: Does the assessment and collection by the state of Utah of income

tax against non-residents, with respect to income derived from a chose-in-action
discovered and entirely liquidated within the state of Nevada, concerning
fraudulent representations made within the state of California, violate (1) the Due

Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, (2) the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States
Constitution, or (3) the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution?
Standard of Review: The Administrative Procedures Act governs
judicial review of the Tax Commission's decisions interpreting statutory
law and the correction of error standard governs such review. The
reviewing court applies the least deferential correction-of-error standard
when reviewing questions of general statutory interpretation.
Neiderhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. v. Utah Tax Com'n,
Auditing Division, 858 P.2d 1034, 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), citing King
v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Utah Ct. App.1993).
Thus, an appellate court grants no deference to an agency's interpretation
of a statute when the court is in as good a position as the agency to
interpret the general statutory provision in question. Nucor Steel Utah Div.
v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 832 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992).
3.

Issue: Does the assessment of Utah income tax against non-residents in

2001 constitute an impermissible effort to obtain an end-run around the statute
of limitations for the 1998 Utah income tax return that reported income derived
from the Champion sales transaction, which transaction was entirely completed
when petitioners were Utah residents?
Standard of Review: The Administrative Procedures Act governs
judicial review of the Tax Commission's decisions interpreting statutory

2

law and the correction of error standard governs such review. The
reviewing court applies the least deferential correction-of-error standard
when reviewing questions of general statutory interpretation.
Neiderhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. v. Utah Tax Com'n,
Auditing Division, 858 P.2d 1034, 1036 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), citing King
v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Thus, an appellate court grants no deference to an agency's interpretation
of a statute when the court is in as good a position as the agency to
interpret the general statutory provision in question. Nucor Steel Utah Div.
v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 832 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992).
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
1.

U.S. CONST, ART. I, § 8, cl. 3

The Congress shall have Power
* * *

3.
To regular Commerce with Foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.
2.

U.S. CONST, ART. IV, § 2.

See Appendix for full text
3.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. 5

See Appendix for full text
4.

U.S. CONST. AMEND. 14

See Appendix for full text
5.

26U.S.C.§1341
See Appendix for full text
3

6.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-7-115(5) (Supp. 1998)

59-7-115. Section 336(e), Internal Revenue Code - Elections.
• * *

(5) The corporation which is treated as having disposed of its
assets shall be treated as a new corporation as of the day after the
date of sale.
7.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-7-702(2)(b) (Supp. 2001)

59-7-702. Taxation of shareholders.

(2)(b) nonresident shareholder shall recognize that portion of an
S corporation's Utah taxable income derived from Utah sources as
provided in Sections 59-10-117 and 59-10-118.

8.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-7-703(2) (Supp. 2001)

59-7-703. Payment or withholding of tax on behalf of nonresident
shareholders -- Rate.

(2) The commission, by rule, shall determine the rate that an S
corporation shall withhold for nonresident shareholders. The rate
shall be consistent with the composite tax rate paid by
partnerships.
9.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-108.2(2) (Supp. 2001) 1

§ 59-10-108.2. Credit for nonresident shareholders of S
corporations

(2) A nonresident shareholder who is an individual of an S
corporation and who has no other Utah source income may forego
the credit provided in Subsection (1) and not file a Utah individual
income tax return for that year. If the individual is entitled to credits
1

-This section was enacted as § 59-10-108.5 in 2000; it was renumbered by the
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel because of the enactment of
another § 59-10-108.5 at the same session.
4

under Utah law, an individual income tax return must be filed to
claim those credits.
10.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-116 (Supp. 1998)2

§ 59-10-116. Tax on nonresident individual's state taxable income
A tax is hereby imposed on the state taxable income, as defined
in Sections 59-10-111 and 59-10-112, of every nonresident
individual in accordance with the schedules in Section 59-10-104,
but the individual's Utah tax shall be only the portion of the resident
tax so calculated as the individual's federal adjusted gross income
received from Utah sources (determined under Section 59-10-117)
bears to the individual's total federal adjusted gross income for the
same taxable year.
11.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-117(1) (Supp. 2001)

§ 59-10-117(1) Federal adjusted gross income derived from Utah
sources
(1) For the purpose of Section 59-10-116, federal adjusted gross
income derived from Utah sources shall include those items
includable in federal "adjusted gross income" (as defined by
Section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code) attributable to or
resulting from:
(a) the ownership in this state of any interest in real or
tangible personal property (including real property or
property rights from which "gross income from mining" as
defined by Section 613(c) of the Internal Revenue Code is
derived); or
(b) the carrying on of a business, trade, profession, or
occupation in this state.
12.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§59-10-117(2)(a) (Supp. 2001)

(2) For the purposes of Subsection (1):
(a) Income from intangible personal property, including
2

The 2000 Revision of § 59-10-116 did not become effective until January 1,

2002.
5

annuities, dividends, interest, and gains from the disposition
of intangible personal property shall constitute income
derived from Utah sources only to the extent that such
income is from property employed in a trade, business,
profession, or occupation carried on in this state.
13.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-118(1 )(b) (Supp. 2001).

§ 59-10-118. Division of income for tax purposes:
(1) As used in this section unless the context otherwise requires

(b) "Commercial domicile" means the principal place from which
the trade or business of the taxpayer is directed or managed.
14.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-118(5)(c) (Supp. 2001)

(5)
(a) Capital gains and losses from sales of real property
located in this state are allocable to this state.

(c) Capital gains and losses from sales of intangible
personal property are allocable to this state if the taxpayer's
commercial domicile is in this state.

15.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-536 (Supp. 2001)

§ 59-10-536. Limitations on assessment and collection.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of
any tax imposed by this chapter shall be assessed within three
years after the return was filed (whether or not such return was filed
on or after the date prescribed), and no proceeding in court without
assessment for the collection of such tax shall be begun after the
expiration of such period.
(2) For purposes of this section:
(a) A return of tax imposed by this chapter, except
withholding tax, filed before the last day prescribed by
statute or by rules promulgated pursuant to statute for the
filing thereof, shall be deemed to be filed on such last day.

6

(b) If a return of withholding tax for any period ending with
or within a calendar year is filed before April 15 of the
succeeding calendar year, such return shall be deemed to
be filed on April 15 of such succeeding calendar year.
(3) The tax may be assessed at any time if:
(a) no return is filed;
(b) a false or fraudulent return is filed with intent to evade
tax; or
(c) a return for the taxpayer is prepared by the commission
in accordance with Section 59-10-506.
(4) If, before the expiration of the time prescribed in this section for
the assessment of tax, both the commission and the taxpayer have
consented in writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may
be assessed at any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed
upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent
agreements in writing made before the expiration of the period
previously agreed upon.
(5)

(a) If a change is made in a taxpayer's net income on his or
her federal income tax return, either because the taxpayer
has filed an amended return or because of an action by the
federal government, the taxpayer must notify the
commission within 90 days after the final determination of
such change. The taxpayer shall file a copy of the amended
federal return and an amended state return which conforms
to the changes on the federal return. No notification is
required of changes in the taxpayer's federal income tax
return which do not affect state tax liability.
(b) The commission may assess any deficiency in state
income taxes within three years after such report or
amended return was filed. The amount of such assessment
of tax shall not exceed the amount of the increase in Utah
tax attributable to such federal change or correction. The
provisions of this Subsection (b) do not affect the time within
which or the amount for which an assessment may
otherwise be made. However, if the taxpayer fails to report
to the commission the correction specified in this Subsection
(b) the assessment may be made at any time within six
years after the date of said correction.
7

(6) If a deficiency in federal income tax required to be reported is
attributable to the application to the taxpayer of a net operating loss
carryback within the meaning of Section 6501(h) of the Internal
Revenue Code, the corresponding deficiency in the tax imposed by
this chapter may be assessed at any time before the expiration of
the period within which a deficiency for the taxable year of the net
operating loss giving rise to the carryback may be assessed.
(7) An erroneous refund shall be considered an underpayment of
tax on the date made, and an assessment of a deficiency arising
out of an erroneous refund may be made at any time within three
years from the time the refund was made, except that the
assessment may be made within five years from the time the
refund was made if it appears that any part of the refund was
induced by fraud or misrepresentation of a material fact.
(8) If a return is required for a decedent or for his estate during the
period of administration, the tax shall be assessed within 18
months after written request therefor (made after the return is filed)
by the executor, administrator, or other person representing the
estate of such decedent, but not more than three years after the
time the return was filed, except as otherwise provided in
Subsections (3) through (9).
(9) The amount of any tax imposed by this chapter may be
assessed at any time within six years after the time the return was
filed if:
(a) a resident individual, estate, or trust omits from gross
income as reported for federal income tax purposes an
amount properly includable therein which is in excess of
25% of the amount of gross income stated in the return; or
(b) a nonresident individual, estate, or trust omits from
gross income as reported for federal income tax purposes
an amount of adjusted gross income derived from Utah
sources as defined by Section 59-10-117, properly
includable therein, which is in excess of 25% of the amount
of adjusted gross income derived from Utah sources which
is reflected in such return. For the purposes of this
Subsection (b) there may not be taken into account any
amount which is omitted in the return if such amount is
disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached to the
return, in a manner adequate to apprise the commission of
the nature and amount of such item.
8

(10) The running of the period of limitations on assessments or
collection of tax or other amount (or of a transferee's liability) shall,
after the mailing of a notice of deficiency, be suspended for the
period during which the commission is prohibited from making the
assessment or from collecting by levy.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of Proceedings.

Appellants appealed an audit deficiency of Utah individual income tax issued by
the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") for the tax year 2001. On October
23, 2005, the Auditing Division (the "Division") issued a Statutory Notice of Estimated
Income Tax to the Petitioners ("Petitioners" or the "Mandells") showing a deficiency in
Utah state income tax for 2001 of $70,129.62, penalties of $ 14,025,92 and interest of
$6,148 as of the date of the assessment.
B.

Course of Proceedings Below.

Petitioners appealed the supplemental assessment and a formal hearing was
held January 13, 2005.
C.

Disposition by Tax Commission.

On May 10, 2006, the Commission issued its Final Decision, sustained the
Division's Statutory Notice, and waived the penalties included in the Notice.
D.

Statement of Facts.

1.

Petitioners appealed an income tax deficiency of Utah individual income

tax issued by the Division for the tax year 2001. On October 23, 2005, the Division
issued a Statutory Notice of Estimated Income Tax to the Mandells showing a
deficiency in Utah state income tax for 2001 of $70,129.62, penalties of $ 14,025,92
9

and interest of $6,148 as of the date of the assessment. Commission's Findings of
Fact ("FOF") 1| 1 at R. 41 and Respondent's Exhibit 1, "Statutory Notice."
2.

The Mandells did not file a Utah state income tax return for the tax year

2001. They were not residents of the state of Utah for purposes of income tax for the
year 2001. FOF H 2 at R. 41.
3.

The deficiency represented by the Statutory Notice related to a

$1,127,977.00 payment made to the Mandells as settlement of a lawsuit they had filed
in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada against the estate of
Eugene Whitworth. The lawsuit involved the actions of Whitworth during the
negotiations and completion of the sale of Homes America of Utah, Inc. ("HAU") to
Champion Homes, Inc. ("Champion"). FOF fl 3 at R. 41 and Respondent's Exhibits 1,
3, 4 & 5 .
4.

The sale of HAU to Champion occurred in 1998. FOF U 4 at R. 41 and

Respondent's Exhibit 6.
5.

The Mandells were residents of the state of Utah when the sale of HAU to

Champion occurred. FOF U 5 at R. 41.
6.

While Dennis Mandell was a shareholder of HAU, HAU was a Utah

corporation doing business in Utah that filed as a subchapter S corporation for federal
income tax purposes. FOF U 6 at R. 41 and Respondent's Exhibit 6, J 3.13.2, "Stock
Purchase Agreement."
7.

HAU sold mobile homes in Utah under the brand "Homes America." FOF

10

U 7 at 41 and Respondent's Exhibit 5, p. 3:18-20, "Motion for Summary Judgment".3
8.

Mr. Mandell managed HAU from its date of incorporation and the

Mandells were residents of Utah from 1995 to March of 1999. FOF H 8 at R. 41.
9.

HAU had three shareholders as follows: Mr. Mandell owned 20% of the

stock, Gerald Meyer owned 20% and Eugene Whitworth ("Whitworth") owned 60%.
FOF 11 9 at R. 41-42 and Respondent's Exhibit 1, p. 57.
10.

Mr. Mandell testified that his management services for HAU were

performed in anticipation of an increase of the value of his stock interest in HAU. FOF
U 10 at R. 42.
11.

Whitworth, in addition to his controlling interest in HAU, controlled eight

other corporations operating in states other than Utah, but in the same line of business
as HAU. These corporations consisted of Whitworth Management, Inc., a Nevada
corporation, Homes America of Arizona, Inc., an Arizona corporation, American
Transport, Inc., a Nevada corporation, USA Mobile Homes, Inc., an Oregon corporation,
Factory Homes Outlet, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Homes America of Oklahoma, Inc.,
an Oklahoma corporation, Homes America of California, Inc., a California corporation,
Homes America Finance, Inc., a Nevada corporation. FOF 1J11 at R. 42 and
Respondent's Exhibit 6, "Stock Purchase Agreement," p. 49.
12.

In 1998, Champion entered into negotiations with Whitworth for the

purchase of HAU and the other eight corporations. FOF U 12 at R. 42.

3

The Mandells' Motion for Summary Judgment filed in their action against Jerry
Ashford, et al., in the Second District Court of the State of Nevada, Washoe County,
Case No. CV0002977.
11

13.

Whitworth and Champion negotiated a total price for the nine

corporations, including HAU, of $102.5 million dollars. FOF H 13 at R. 42 and
Respondent's Exhibit 5, "Motion for Summary Judgment" at p. 5.
14.

As a condition of the purchase, Champion required that all corporations

be part of the acquisition. FOF U 14 at R. 42 and Respondent's Exhibit 5 at p.4:22-23.
15.

The purchase price included $67.5 million in cash, $5 million in cash held

back for eighteen months for unknown liabilities and $30 million in contingent payments
based upon the combined future earnings of the nine corporations. FOF fi 15 at R. 42
and See Respondent's Exhibit 5, p.5, Exhibit 6, U 2.1.3.
16.

The $67.5 million in cash and $5 million hold back was paid by Champion,

but the $30 million dollar contingent payment remained an unrealized contingency.
FOF 1| 16 at R. 42-43 and Respondent's Exhibit 5, p. 5.
17.

Whitworth allocated this purchase price to the nine corporations. FOF fl

17 at R. 43.
18.

Mr. Mandell summarized Whitworth's allocation of the purchase price as

follows:
Whitworth never obtained an independent valuation of the nine
corporations. The allocation of purchase price for the nine
corporations was simply established by Whitworth stating what he
wanted to pay each minority shareholder. . . . The result of the
Whitworth allocations was that approximately 90% of the purchase
price or 96% of the cash went to Whitworth. Corporations owned
100% by Whitworth received 80% to 100% allocated purchase
price in cash. {HAU] received approximately 38% of the Whitworth
allocation of the purchase price in cash. Even though the 1997
audited financial statements, the basis of the Champion
Iransaction, established that the minority interests were valued at
over 20% of the total net 1997 income for the nine corporations,
Whitworth received $69,677,100.00 (96.11%) of the
12

$72,500,000.00 cash portion of the purchase price paid by
Champion Homes while the minority shareholders received a total
of $2,822,900.00 (3.89%).
FOF 1| 18 at R. 43 and Respondent's Exhibit 5 at p. 5:25 - 6:3.
19.

Whitworth directed that $8,105 million of the total $102.5 million purchase

price be allocated to HAU. FOF fl 19 at R. 43 and Respondent's Exhibit 5 at 6:4-10.
20.

Whitworth directed that only 38% (or $3,105 Million) of the $8,105 Million

allocated to HAU be comprised of the cash portion of the purchase price with 62% (or
$5 Million) pertaining to the deferred portion of the purchase price never realized. FOF
H 20 at R. 43 and Respondent's Exhibit 6.
21.

Mr. Mandell's interest in the $8,105 million purchase price was $1,671

million. However, the cash portion of the purchase price allocated to Mr. Mandell was
only $621,000. FOF U 21 at R. 43 and Respondent's Exhibit 6.
22.

Mr. Mandell received the $621,000 cash portion of the purchase price of

HAU when he and the other shareholders consummated the sale to Champion Homes
based upon these terms on March 27, 1998, concurrently with the other Whitworth
corporations. Mr. Mandell did not receive any of the deferred portions. FOF fl 22 at R.
43-44 and Respondent's Exhibit 6, "Purchase Agreement".
23.

Mr. Mandell and the other shareholders made an IRC § 338(h)(10)

election which caused the sale to be deemed an asset sale of the property of HAU and
subsequent liquidation of the sale proceeds to the shareholders. FOF U 23 at R. 44
and Respondent's Exhibit 6, Tf 3.13.11.
24.

All of the shareholders in the other eight Whitworth corporations whose

sale was also included in the transactions executed a Section 338(h)(10) election. FOF

13

U 24 at R. 44 and Respondent's Exhibit 8.
25.

HAU and the other corporations stepped up the basis of their assets as a

result of the sale and IRC § 338(h)(10) election. FOF U 25 at R. 44 and Respondent's
Exhibit 7.
26.

HAU reported Utah as its "commercial domicile" on its 1998 Utah income

tax return. FOF U 26 at R. 44 and Respondent's Exhibit 7 at p.2, in 3.
27.

HAU reported on its Utah income tax return as business income the gain it

received on its § 338(h)(10) deemed sale of assets to Champion. FOF U 27 at R. 44
and Respondent's Exhibit 7, "HAU 1998 TC-20S," Schedule A, line 5.b.
28.

HAU reported a 100% business income apportionment fraction to Utah on

its 1998 Utah income tax return. FOF 1J 28 at R. 44 and Respondent's Exhibit 7, "HAU
1998 TC-20S", Schedule A at line 6.
29.

Whitworth died in 1998. FOF fl 29 at R. 44 and Respondent's Exhibit 4,

p. 4, If 22.
30.

The Mandells changed their domicile and permanently moved to the state

of Nevada in 1999. For the tax year in question, 2001, they were no longer Utah
resident individuals for state income tax purposes. FOF U 30 at R. 44.
31.

After Whitworth' s death, Mr. Mandell learned that Whitworth had not fairly

allocated the purchase price from Champion Homes and the cash portion of the
purchase price to HAU. In 2000, Mandell filed a Complaint against the Estate of
Whitworth et al. FOF U 31 at R. 44 and Respondent's Exhibit 4.
32.

The Complaint contained the following allegations.
[Mandell] discovered that the allocations of the purchase price
14

affixed by Whitworth for each corporation were not based upon the
actual values of each corporation compared to the total purchase
price offered by Champion Homes Center, Inc. Instead,
Whitworth's allocation inflated the values of those companies that
he exclusively owned or where he had a large percentage of
ownership. These allocations decreased the true value of
[Mandell's] ownership in [HAU].
FOF U 32 at R. 44-45 and Respondent's Exhibit 4, U 19.
33.

The Complaint further alleged:
Whitworth also allocated a substantially larger percentage of the
cash proceeds of the purchase price to himself as compared to the
cash paid to [Mandell]. [Mandell was] left relying upon achieving
the uncertain performance criteria for the bulk of [his] allocated
purchase price. On information and belief, Whitworth has
transferred and assigned to the Gene Whitworth Trust payments of
money, effects and other value things, received by Whitworth as a
result of his disproportion allocation of purchase price and cash
payments to the Homes America Sale.

FOF H 33 at R. 45 and Respondent's Exhibit 4, U 20 and 21.
34.

The damages requested in the Complaint consisted of a constructive trust

upon the proceeds received by Whitworth which were disproportionate and which
should have been paid to Mr. Mandell. FOF U 34 at R. 45 and Respondent's Exhibit 4,
p.9.
35.

Mr. Mandell settled the Complaint in 2001 and reported a taxable gain

from such settlement of $1,127,977. The confidential Settlement Agreement released
and discharged any claim alleged in the Compliant. As a result of the settlement of the
complaint an additional payment of $1,127,977, this brought the total payment to Mr.
Mandell to approximately $1.75 million. The original allocation set forth in the purchase
agreement had been $1.67 1 million. FOF U 35 at R. 45 and Respondent's Exhibits 2,
3 and 6.
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36.

Kenneth Stieha prepared the Mandells' 2001 federal income tax return,

and he testified that regardless of the nature of the claim, the damages related to
Mandell's interest in HAU should be reported as a capital gain, not as ordinary income.
FOF fl 36 at R. 45.
37.

Mr. Mandell reported his share of the additional sale proceeds received

under the settlement on his federal 2001 income tax return, Schedule D, Part II, as a
long term capital gain on the sale of his "20% stock interest of Homes America of Utah,
Inc., sold on 9/15/01." FOF U 40 at R. 45-46 and Respondent's Exhibit 2, p. 7.
38.

The Estate of Whitworth took an IRC § 1341(a) claim of right credit on its

2001 1041 federal income tax return to offset the settlement proceeds it paid to Mandell
in 2001 against the income previously recognized by Whitworth in 1998 from the
original sale. FOF U 41 at R. 46 and Respondent's Exhibit 9.
39.

In 2001, the Estate of Whitworth attempted to file an amended 1998 Utah

State Income Tax Return reducing its Utah gain recognized from the sale of
Whitworth's stock by the amount of the settlement proceeds paid to Mandell in 2001.
FOF H 42 at R. 46 and Respondent's Exhibit 9, "Estate of Whitworth' s 2001 Amended
Utah TC-40."
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

While residents of Utah, Petitioners sold all of their stock in Homes America to
Champion at a price established in the Stock Purchase Agreement. Champion, the
buyer, paid Petitioners the full purchase price under the Stock Purchase Agreement for
the 20% of Homes America represented by Petitioners' shares, and Champion, the
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acquiring corporation, elected to treat that payment as a payment for 20% of the assets
of Homes America, under the fictional "deemed asset sale" allowed by 26 U.S.C. §
338(h)(10) for certain stock purchases. Champion's performance under, and payments
made pursuant to, the Stock Purchase Agreement are not at issue in this case.
Petitioners received a K-1 from Homes America describing their gain under the
Stock Purchase Agreement. Petitioners filed a Utah joint tax return, and paid all taxes
associated with the gain they received through payments from Champion under the
Stock Purchase Agreement. The gain derived from the Stock Purchase Agreement,
and the section 338 election by Champion applicable to that gain, is not the source of
Petitioners' income in this case.4
After leaving the state of Utah and establishing residency in the state of Nevada,
Petitioners discovered facts which led them to believe that Whitworth had defrauded
them in the stock sale transaction by undervaluing their stock and overvaluing the stock
of entities involved in the same transaction which were owned by Whitworth.
Whitworth's conduct resulted in Petitioners receiving less than the full value of their
stock. However, the stock sale was complete and final in 1998. Petitioners were not
able to go back to Champion, the purchaser of their stock, and demand additional
consideration, or demand that Champion require Whitworth to disgorge the excess
value of his, Whitworth's, stock in other entities involved in the same transaction so that

4

Although the stock purchase agreement contained provisions for additional
consideration to be paid to Petitioners in the event Homes American, Inc. reached
certain performance goals, those goals were not reached and no additional "earnout" or
additional consideration was paid to Petitioners in connection with the sale of their
stock.
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Champion could then make Petitioners whole. Petitioners' only recourse was to file suit
against Whitworth to recover the additional value of their property, out of which
Whitworth had defrauded them.
Despite having conceded that Whitworth's fraud was a different transaction from
the sale of the stock to Champion, and that the only proceeds from the sale of
Petitioners' stock as to which Petitioners agreed that Champion could make a section
338 election were the funds he received from Champion as the agreed purchase price
for his stock in 1988, the Division nevertheless takes the position that the Mandells
owe Utah income tax on money they received from Whitworth in 2001 in settlement of
the Nevada litigation, while they were residents of the state of Nevada.
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH HAS NO TAXING JURISDICTION OVER THE NON-RESIDENT PETITIONERS FOR
THE TAX YEAR IN QUESTION.

"In case of doubt," taxing statutes are "construed in favor of the taxpayer so as to
avoid the levying of taxes by implication." Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 845
P.2d 266, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
It is an established rule in the construction of tax statutes that if any
doubt exists as to the meaning of the statute, our practice is to
construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer leaving it
to the Legislature to clari& an intent to be more restrictive if such
intent exist.
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d
370, 374 (Utah 1997); see also Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917) ("In the
interpretation of statutes levying taxes, it is the established rule not to extend their
provisions, by implication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge
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their operation so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt
they are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen.").
Any doubt about the meaning of Utah's tax statutes as they relate to the
taxability of income received by Petitioners in 2001 as a result of litigation which arose
as a result of fraudulent representations made to Petitioners in California and
settlement of litigation subsequently brought and prosecuted in Nevada, doubts should
have been construed in favor of Petitioners and against the Division. When asked what
specific provision in the Utah Tax Code permitted taxation of an individual for income
received in 2001 by looking back" to a sale of stock that occurred in 1998, the
Division's witness, Brent Taylor, testified: "[Section] 59-10-118 simply tells how to divide
that Utah source income. And at that time of that sale in '98 it - in my opinion is Utah
source income. And / don't think the code says you can't or can." Tr. 131:4-8.
Thus, the Division acknowledges that the Code is silent on the issue and it should,
therefore, have been resolved in favor of Petitioners and against the Division and
taxation in 2001.
A.

Taxing Petitioners' 2001 Income Violates Due Process And
Commerce Clauses.

A starting point for analysis of a state's attempt to tax a non-resident is to assess
whether such attempt violates the Due Process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to, and the commerce clause of, the United States Constitution. "As a
general principle, a State may not tax value earned outside its borders." ASARCO Inc.
v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 458 U.S. 307, 315 (1982). "The broad inquiry in a
case such as this, therefore, is 'whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears
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fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state."' Id. "Under
both the Due Process and the Commerce Clauses of the Constitution, a State may not,
when imposing an income-based tax, 'tax value earned outside its borders.'" Hercules,
Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 351 Md. 101, 109, 716 A.2d 276, 279 (Md. Ct. App.
1998).
Since both the individual and commercial domiciles of the Petitioners was the
state of Nevada when they discovered their fraud claim against Mr. Whitworth, and they
pursued such claim to settlement by invoking the judicial machinery of Nevada, the
settlement of that claim has nothing whatsoever to do with any benefit or protection
afforded them by the state of Utah. This is in clear contravention of the Due Process
clause and commerce clause. To the extent that Petitioners' claims against Whitworth
were "sold" to Whitworth's Trust and Estate via the settlement agreement, Petitioners
had no "commercial domicile" within Utah at the time of the settlement, as required by
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-118(5)(c). Nor was this fraud claim against Mr. Whitworth

"from property employed in a trade, business, profession, or occupation carried on in
this state."

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-117(2)(a). It was derived from fraud, committed

by Whitworth, in the state of California, and litigated in the state of Nevada.
The Division has also attempted to take the position that the Petitioners'
settlement resulted in a "reallocation" of the proceeds of the larger 1998 sale by Mr.
Whitworth of the Whitworth Businesses. Petitioners were not involved in allocating
anything. Their stock having been sold for the price they agreed, there was nothing
further for them to sell. They accepted the price that Mr. Whitworth represented he had
obtained from Champion in good faith for their shares, and Champion paid the
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Petitioners that price, not some "reallocated " price. What Petitioners owned in 2001
was not stock they could sell, but rather a cause of action against the person who
caused them to sell their stock at a price set by the fraudulent conduct of Mr.
Whitworth. The effect of the Division's position would be simply to re-impose on
Petitioners the effects, or some of them, of Mr. Whitworth's fraud. If Mr. Whitworth's
fraudulent conduct also victimized the Utah State Tax Commission, as well as
Petitioners, the Utah State Tax Commission should pursue Mr. Whitworth, not his fraud
victims. It is neither a crime nor unfair for Petitioners to have exercised their rights to
move to Nevada, regardless of the fact that Utah cannot now tax their income. To the
contrary, the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution would
seem to guarantee them that right without penalty. This is because Utah would
discriminate against Petitioners for moving out of Utah by requiring that they forever pay
tax to Utah on post-move income, when Utah would impose no such penalty against
other persons. See generally Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S.
287, 298-315 (1998) (general discussion of privileges and immunities issues in state
taxation). The intangible owned by Petitioners, their chose-in-action against Mr.
Whitworth, traveled with them to the state of Nevada. See Cudahy v. Wisconsin
Department of Taxation, 261 Wis. 126, 136, 52 N.W.2d 467, 472 (1952)("that the situs
of such intangibles as corporate stock is the domicile of the owner. . . .")
The testimony was clear that Mr. Whitworth's fraud on Petitioners was
perpetrated in California, in 1998. Mr. Mandell did not discover the fraud until after he
was domiciled in Nevada in 2000, and the income from the settlement was received in
2001, while Petitioners were domiciled in Nevada. Since the situs of an intangible such
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as a chose-in-action is the domicile of its owner, see generally
16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws, § 57 ("The statement is sometimes made that
intangible personal property, such as evidences of debt and other choses in action,
follows the person, [FN94] and, in conformity with the maxim "mobilia sequuntur
personam" [FN95] has its situs at the domicil of the owner. [FN96]"),5 the chose-inaction against Mr. Whitworth which was essentially sold to his estate for the settlement
amount, had its situs, as well, in Nevada, in 2000 and 2001.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-

118(5)(c) expressly governs taxation of such intangible property and prohibits taxation
unless the taxpayer has a "commercial domicile" in Utah. Petitioners clearly did not,
because the applicable definition of "commercial domicile,"

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-

118(1)(b), requires that Petitioners' "principle place from which the trade or business of
the taxpayer is directed or managed[,]" id, be in Utah, and Petitioners had no
connection with Utah in 2001.
B.

Petitioners' Income At Issue Was Derived From The Separate Fraud
Transaction Concerning Whitworth, Not The Sale of Stock To
Champion.

In its Final Decision, the Commission correctly framed the question before it as
whether the settlement proceeds received by Petitioners in 2001 were subject to Utah
income tax. The Commission then noted that, in its view, the "character and nature" of

5

Utah law also recognizes that the situs of an intangible for taxation purposes is
the domicile of the owner of that intangible. See Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 P.
1097, 1099 (Utah 1897)("A mortgage is a security for a debt, which debt is a species of
property, intangible, it is true, but nevertheless distinct property, capable of ownership;
and, if not for all purposes, it may for that of taxation be regarded as situated at the
domicile of the creditor or owner, and, if his residence is within the jurisdiction of the
state, the situs of the debt is also within such jurisdiction."
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the settlement proceeds must first be determined. From that point, the Commission
allowed itself to be drawn into the Division's mistake of including the complex sale of
Whitworth's divergent interests in many companies in many states with the single
transaction of Petitioners' stock sale to Champion.
The Commission's decision ignores several key facts. Mr. Taylor acknowledged
that Petitioners were not residents of the state of Utah in 2001, the tax year at issue (Tr.
128:9-22); that Mr. Mandell did not have a commercial domicile in the state of Utah for
tax year 2001, within the meaning of

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-103(1 )(d) (Tr. 129:4-18);

and that Petitioners did not agree to a section 338 election for any proceeds other than
those received in 1998 (Tr. 139:10-21).
The Commission's decision ignores the fact that it was the domicile in Utah of
Petitioners in tax year 1998 that subjected the gain from that sale to taxation in Utah.
Mr. Mandell agreed with Champion as to the price it would pay him for his stock in
1998. Champion paid Mr. Mandell the full purchase price in 1998, Mr. Mandell
transferred to Champion all of his stock in Homes America in 1998, Mr. Mandell
consented to a section 338 election on the funds that represented the purchase of his
stock by Champion in 1998, the election was made and tax treatment allowed to
Champion under that election in 1998, and the transaction was fully completed in 1998.
Petitioners reported all the gain on that transaction on their 1998 Utah individual tax
return and paid all the tax they owed on such gain as reported in that return.
Respondent confuses the larger transaction between Mr. Whitworth and
Champion, which involved the sale of many companies in different states, with the
single transaction entered into between Mr. Mandell and Champion for the sale of Mr.
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Mandell's stock in Homes America. That confusion resulted in the incorrect result
before the Commission, because whatever happened as between Whitworth and
Champion did not give rise to any income to Petitioners. Petitioners received income in
two very distinct ways. First, from Champion, based on the negotiated and fullyperformed stock purchase in 1998. Second, and entirely separate from Champion,
Petitioners received income in 2001 from Mr. Whitworth, for the fraud he committed on
Petitioners in inducing Mr. Mandell to believe that the price Whitworth recommended to
Mr. Mandell was, in fact, the fair value, when it was not. Although this fraud caused Mr.
Mandell to decide to sell his Homes America stock at the price Mr. Whitworth
recommended, the decision to sell at the recommended price was an event distinct
from the actual sale, and utterly unrelated to the state of Utah. Moreover, in 2001, the
tax year at issue, the Mandells had neither an individual nor a commercial domicile in
Utah.
Respondent's Exhibit 9 establishes that Whitworth declared no Utah income
from the purchase and sales transaction between he and Champion for the sale of his
Homes America stock in 1998. Nor did Mr. Whitworth declare any income from his
fraudulent theft of value from Mr. Mandell by inducing Mr. Mandell to agree to sell his
Homes America stock at a lower-than-fair-value price. Respondent's Exhibit 9 further
demonstrates that Whitworth's estate, in submitting its proposed amended tax return to
the Division, sought to perpetuate the original tax fraud committed by Whitworth. The
estate sought to declare only the fraudulently-undervalued gain on the sale of the
Whitworth stock to Champion, failed to report any income derived from the fraud on
Petitioners and sought to declare a tax credit based on the estate's settlement of
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Petitioners' fraud claim, even though no Utah income had been reported based on the
proceeds of the fraud.
Petitioners' 2001 income did not come from Champion, nor did it in any way pass
through Homes America or the state of Utah. It simply did not do so. Homes America
declared all of the income it received on the 1998 section 338 election deemed sale of
its assets as Utah income. Petitioners paid Utah taxes on their percentage of all such
income received by Homes America in 1998. Homes America did not exist in 2001 and
received no income in 2001, nor was it entitled to any income in 2001.
II.

T H E AUTHORITY RELIED UPON B Y T H E DIVISION A N D T H E COMMISSION IS
INAPPOSITE.

At the formal hearing, the Division argued that the settlement proceeds are
taxable in Utah because those proceeds retain the "tax character" of the stock purchase
and sale transaction. The Division cited several cases in support of its argument.
Those cases are distinguishable from Petitioners' case here, as noted below:
1.

Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Revenue, 15 Or. Tax 101, 2000 WL

1025573 (Or. Tax Regular Div.).6 This case was decided based on corporate unitary
tax principles that are not applicable to the Petitioners, who are individuals. There
appears to have been no question that Pennzoil maintained a commercial domicile in
Oregon during the tax year at issue. Instead, the question that was raised was whether
the income generated related to Pennzoil's unitary operation so as to be apportionable
in part to Oregon. Here, the Petitioners maintained neither an individual or commercial

6

Pennzoil Co. v. Department of Revenue, 332 Or. 552, 33 P.3d 314 (Ore. 2001)
is the citation for the affirmance and thus is not treated as a separate case.
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domicile within the state of Utah during the tax year at issue, 2001. In addition, Homes
America, in 1998, was a Utah corporation doing business entirely within Utah, and was
not, itself, subject to unitary taxation principles. By 2001, the tax year in question,
Homes America did not exist, in Utah or elsewhere. The question decided in this case
was that the Texaco settlement was business income, subject to corporate unitary
taxation principles. Pennzoil's judgment against Texaco for interference with
PennzoiPs contract with Getty Oil is an entirely different situation. In addition to the
points of distinction concerning that case above, it is important to look at what the
damages there actually were - the contractual transaction with Getty Oil was stolen the damages made Pennzoil whole for that contract See id. at 109. In this case,
Petitoners in fact received all of the benefit of their contract with Champion. What was
stolen here was not the contract with Champion or any part thereof.
2.

Tenneco West, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1510,

286 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ca. Ct. App. 1991). That case is, again, a unitary taxation,
corporate business income case, inapplicable to individuals. The facts of that case
involved an "installment sale," rather than the fully-paid sales transaction present in this
case. In this case, all of the Petitioners' stock was sold to Champion, and fully paid
under the sales contract, long before the Petitioners' fraud-settlement income was
received from the estate of Mr. Whitworth, who was not the buyer on the contract. The
legal issue determined in the Tenneco West case was whether, for unitary
apportionment purposes, the date of the sales contract or the date of receipt of income
would be used to determine the percentage of income apportioned to California, when
the circumstances had changed in the interim period. Since neither unitary corporate
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taxation nor its apportionment principles apply here, the Tenneco West case is legally
and factually inapposite.
3.

Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). The Hort case involves the tax

treatment of the proceeds of a buyout of a lease of real property. The taxpayer argued
for capital gain treatment. Not surprisingly, since lease payments are ordinary income,
and no real property had in fact been sold, the Court determined that the income was
not capital gain. The question of whether the Petitioners are entitled to capital gain
treatment for their fraud damages against Whitworth is not related to the fact that
Champion had purchased and fully paid for all of the Petitioners' stock in Homes
America years before. Since Whitworth fraudulently induced the Mandells to contract
for a purchase price less than fair value for the sale of their shares to Champion, the
fraud damages could fairly be argued to be treated as capital gain, even though they
did not come from the actual contract for the purchase and sale of the shares. Here,
unlike the facts in the Hort case, Petitioners' stock had actually been sold and fully paid
for by Champion. The fraud damages caused by the separate fraud transaction of
Whitworth in inducing Mandell to sell for a price less than fair value are at least
arguably entitled to capital gain treatment, even though the damages are not proceeds
from the sale of the stock. The Hort case is thus legally and factually inapposite.
4.

In re Gordon, Appeal No. 83-SBE-005 (Cal. Bd. Equalization January 3,

1983). This California administrative decision has no precedential value and, indeed,
Petitioners' counsel has found not a single reported court case in the 22 years since it
was decided that has relied on its rationale. Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of
argument, only, that its holding re instalment sales contracts for the sale of stock is
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sustainable, this case, unlike Gordon, does not involve any installment sale. The sale
to Champion of the Mandells' stock was entirely completed, at the contract price, long
before the Mandells sued, not the buyer, but Whitworth. The fraud by Whitworth was
committed on the Mandells in California, not Utah, so their cause of action arose in
California and not Utah/ Even the Gordon decision recognizes that its holding is
sustainable only where, as was the situation in that case, the entitlement to future
payments was not subject to any substantial contingency. "If there are substantial
contingencies as to the. taxpayer's right to receive, or uncertainty as to the amount he is
to receive, an item of income does not accrue until the contingency or events have
occurred and fixed the fact and amount of the sum involved. (Midwest Motor Express,
Inc., 27 T.C. 167 (1956), affd., 251 F.2d 405 (8th Cir.1958); San Francisco Stevedoring
Co., 8 T.C, 222 (1947).)," Gordon, at 474. Since a substantial contingency existed in
this case, in the form of prevailing on a fraud claim against a former co-venturer, and
was the only means to recover the value that co-venturer stole, Gordon is inapposite by
its own rationale.
III.

THE 338 ELECTION DOES NOT SUBJECT PETITIONERS TO THE TAXING JURISDICTION
OF UTAH.

In the Stock Sale transaction which was concluded between Champion and
Petitioners in 1998, Petitioners were subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the state of
Utah only because they were at that time domiciled in Utah. Mr. Taylor conceded that
the "old" Homes America ceased to exist in 1998 under Utah's statute,7

UTAH CODE

ANN. § 59-7-114(6). The instant case is similar to the situation in American States

testimony of Mr. Taylor, Tr. 47:12-16.
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Insurance Company v. Hamer, 352 lll.App.3d 521, 816 N.E.2d 659, 287 III.Dec. 692 (III.
Ct. App. 2004) [hereinafter "Hamer"]. In Hamer, the Court recognized the majority
position that the income in the present situation is not business income to the
corporation. Even more pertinent here, the "old" corporation did not exist so as to
receive any taxable income that could be subject to a section 338 election in 2001, and
none was made in 2001. The evidence was undisputed that the income of the
Petitioners subject to a section 338 election was strictly what had been reported on
Homes America's 1998 return. Since no 338 election could have been made by the
"old" corporation in 2001, Petitioners' 2001 income could not be subject to taxing
jurisdiction of Utah based on any section 338 election.
Mr. Taylor conceded that Petitioners, individuals, were not subject to corporate
unitary taxation principles. (Tr. 127:20-25.) No matter what the situation with the
Whitworth entities, or whether they would qualify for unitary taxation8, any "reallocation"
of the section sale 338 proceeds between Whitworth entities was unrelated to
Petitioners, who simply were not domiciled in Utah in 2001, and had been fully paid on
the section 338 transaction in 1998.
Even if the Division could characterize the settlement proceeds as a restitution of
share ownership of an entity that was non-existent in 2001, and sale of such remaining
imaginary stock interest in 2001, Petitioners, as nonresidents in 2001, would expressly
be allowed by

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-108.2(2) not to file a Utah individual income tax

return in 2001, because any income received through Homes America, which was an S
8

lt is doubtful those entities would qualify for unitary treatment, since each state's
entity that was a dealer in manufactured homes operated strictly in a particular state.
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corporation, would have been taxable to it and it had a duty to pay or withhold any
taxes. The fact that Homes America was deemed no longer to exist establishes that
there could be no 338 election by it for the 2001 income and that the income
necessarily was derived from some source other than the Stock Sale transaction, which
was completed in 1998.
Petitioners, in 2001, were domiciled in Nevada. They conducted no business
activities in Utah and could not be subjected to taxation in Utah for income received in
2001. See Corning Glassworks, Inc. v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 241 Va. 353,
402 S.E.2d 35 (Va. 1991)(State may not tax income of non-resident derived "unless
there is a 'minimal connection' or 'nexus' between the interstate activities and the taxing
state and 'a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the
intrastate values of the enterprise.'") In this case, no such rational relationship exists
between the fraud-derived income and Utah, so Utah may not tax the income.
IV.

ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.

In the Division's Prehearing Memorandum (R. 216-219), it argued that the
Mandells should be "estopped" from showing that they are not subject to the taxing
jurisdiction of the state of Utah in 2001, because, on their 2001 federal tax return, they
claimed capital gain treatment for their income received in settlement of their fraud
claims against Whitworth. The Commission did not so rule, but this argument cannot
be an alternate ground for affirmance. In the first instance, how Petitioners 2001
income should be treated or characterized and under what circumstances the concept
of estoppel might be applied were not issues properly before the Commission. What
was before the Commission was Petitioners' objection to the attempt by the State of
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Utah to exercise any taxing jurisdiction at all over their 2001 income, derived from the
settlement of their fraud claims against Mr. Whitworth. If this State has no jurisdiction
over them at all, under its own statutes or by virtue of the Due Process Clause,
Commerce Clause and/or Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United State
Constitution, then this Commission has no jurisdiction to determine whether an estoppel
could be asserted as to the character of the income.
The Division's argument is flawed in other respects, as well. The Division cites
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983), and Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor
Control Commission, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), for a general proposition about the
existence of equitable estoppel. However, "[generally speaking, one of the essential
elements of equitable estoppel, so far as the party to be estopped is concerned, is that
he should have intended, or at least have expected, that his conduct on which it is
sought to predicate the estoppel should be acted upon by the other party or by other
persons. In other words, it is ordinarily essential that the party sought to be concluded
by the estoppel should have intended that his words or conduct would be relied upon by
others and influence their action, or at least, that they should be of such a character as
would induce a reasonable and prudent man to believe that they were meant to be
relied and acted upon." 28 AM. JUR. 2D, Estoppel and Waiver, § 46.
This requirement of Utah law, as well, has been recognized for many years. See
Barber v. Anderson, 73 Utah 357, 274 P. 136, 138 (1929)("The conduct must be done
with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will be acted upon by the other
party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be so
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acted upon."); accord IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K Management, Inc., 2003 UT 5,
1110, 73 P.3d 320, 324 ("In order to prevail on a claim for equitable estoppel a party
must show that the party to be estopped acted in such a way as to induce reasonable
reliance by the other party and that allowing the first party to act contrary to its earlier
actions would work to the detriment of the relying party.") In this case, Petitioners made
no representations to the state of Utah regarding their 2001 income, filed no 2001 tax
return with Utah, did not intend Utah to rely on their 2001 federal tax return, that they
did not provide to Utah, and no reasonable reliance on their 2001 return could be
shown. Finally, the State has suffered no real detriment from its own prior actions with
respect to Mr. Whitworth in any event. To the extent that the Whitworth estate settled
its own Utah tax liability, it did so by fraudulently misrepresenting the facts and
circumstances to the Division, Neither Mr. Whitwoth nor his estate ever reported as
Utah source income the proceeds of his 1998 fraud on the Petitioners, not even in the
proposed 1998 amended return they supplied the Division. Yet the Estate falsely
claimed in its claim of right that the 2001 payment it made to Petitioners was related to
its 1998 income. This contention is palpably false, as the Division will concede,
because not one penny of the fraud proceeds were reported as income.
Because Petitioners had no knowledge of their claim until after they became a
domiciliary of Nevada, and the situs of ownership of that intangible chose-in-action was
their Nevada domicile at the time suit was filed and then settled, Utah lacks any
constitutional basis to assert taxing authority over the settlement proceeds.
In Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1993), the United States Court of
Appeals resolved legal issues that perfectly explain the distinction between the original
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Stock Sale transaction Mr. Mandell consummated with Champion, and the fraud
transaction in which Mr. Whitworth's estate ultimately made some civil restitution to Mr.
Mandell for the value stolen by Mr. Whitworth. Kraft, a doctor, had submitted false
claims to Blue Cross/Blue Shield and thereby defrauded it Blue Cross/Blue Shield into
paying him money to which he was not entitled. See id. at 293-94. Although Kraft's
subchapter-S corporation reported such illicit income on its tax returns, Kraft, like
Whitworth here, did not report any of the illicit income on his personal tax returns. See
id. at 294-95. After the discovery of his fraud, but before any criminal sentencing or
restitution order, Kraft agreed to repay the fraudulently obtained funds to Blue
Cross/Blue Shield. See id. at 294. Kraft, like Whitworth here, filed an Amended
Individual Tax Return, seeking a claim of right under 26 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). See id.
Unlike Whitworth's estate here, which defrauded the Division by not revealing that its
payments were civil restitution for claimed fraud, Kraft acknowledged that such was the
illicit basis of his agreement to pay restitution and the Internal Revenue Service
promptly denied any relief under Section 1341, stating:
Although the revenue ruling and court cases cited [above] deal
mainly with embezzled funds, the facts clearly point that funds
gained by wrongful or illegal means do not benefit from Section
1341 since the recipient knowingly accepted monies under false
pretenses. Since the taxpayer submitted claims under false and
fictitious individuals, he was aware that he had no "right" to the
monies.
Id.9 Here, the diversion of value by Whitworth's fraud did not go directly to Whitworth,

9

The Internal Revenue Service also denied an effort by Kraft to claim entitlement
to a net operating loss carryback, under section 172, since they were not business
losses. See id. at 295.
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but rather to some out of state entities in which Petitioners had no interest. Those
entities then prepared K-1s for Whitworth's pass-through income, just like Homes
America did for Whitworth's and Mandell's income from that entity. One thing that is for
certain is that, even on his proposed amended return submitted to the Division,
respondent's Exhibit 9, Whitworth declared none of the value he stole from Mandell as
Utah source income. Thus, his estate's representation that he could qualify for a
section 1341 credit from Utah was just another in a series of frauds.
More important to the circumstances of this case, however, the Sixth Circuit
explained that the receipt of funds by Kraft came as income from his professional
corporation, and not directly from the fraud, which resulted in payments by Blue
Cross/Blue Shield to the professional corporation. Kraft resulting failure to report the
illicit income on his individual tax return was dispositive in establishing that the fraud
transaction committed by Kraft, that resulted in greater income to his subchapter-S
corporation, and which was reported on those corporate returns, was a transaction
separate and apart from, for tax purposes, Kraft's civil restitution payments.
Specifically, the Sixth Circuit's analysis went as follows:
Moreover, we find that 26 U.S.C. § 1341 does not support plaintiffs'
claim to a deduction for the $160,000 because plaintiffs never
made a claim of right to the money received from Blue Cross, a
condition required under § 1341. Although Blue Cross made
payments in Jess Kraft's name, he immediately deposited the
funds directly to his professional corporation. The corporation
reported the Blue Cross payments as taxable income. Plaintiff
elected to receive his taxable income from the professional
corporation which co-mingled the Blue Cross payments with funds
from other sources. Plaintiff never included the Blue Cross
payments in his gross income. In other words, plaintiffs fail to
meet the requirements for a deduction under § 1341 because
plaintiffs' obligation to make restitution to Blue Cross did not
34

arise out of the same circumstances, terms and conditions of
his receipt of taxable income from the corporation.
Id. (Emphasis added). The facts are clear in this case that Whitworth did not declare
the value he stole from Mr. Mandell in 1998 as Utah source income on his individual
1998 Utah tax return, at any time. Since Whitworth acquired more value for his stock
in non-Utah corporations, those corporations presumably reported the 338 election sale
of assets in those other states, and those other corporations issued K-1s to Whitworth,
as the evidence implies by virtue of the Whitworth estate arguing to the Division, which
apparently accepted the argument, that this was merely a "reallocation" of proceeds.
There was no "reallocation" with respect to Petitioners, however, as their transaction
with Champion was over and done in 1998. Therefore, to the extent that the illicit
proceeds became co-mingles and lost any character of arising out of the Champion
transaction with Petitioners. Petitioners' 2001 income from their intangible chose-inaction was not "from property employed in a trade, business, profession, or occupation
carried on " in Utah and is therefore not taxable to Utah. See

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-

117(2)(a) (excluding from gross income derived from Utah sources income from
intangible personal property other than as expressed).
Indeed, it is the responsibility of Homes America, not Petitioners, to pay or
withhold Utah taxable income derived from Homes America in 2001. See

UTAH CODE

ANN. § 59-7-703(2)("an S corporation shall pay or withhold a tax on behalf of any
nonresident shareholder.")
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CONCLUSION

The for reasons discussed above, the decision of the Commission should be
reversed and this Court should determine that the state of Utah may not tax any income
of Petitioners received in tax year 2001, and the assessment for taxes and interest
should be vacated.
DATED

this

[}y\

day of December, 2006.
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE

A Professional Corporation

DAVID W. SCOFIELD

Attorneys for Petitioners
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the above
and foregoing Petitioners' Opening Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, this \ Y^\
day of December, 2006, to the following:
Timothy A. Bodily
Assistant Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 140874
Salt Lake City Utah 84114-0874
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came hefore the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on
January 13, 2005. The matter is before the Commission on an appeal of a Utah Individual Income Tax
Audit deficiency issued for the tax year 2001. The parties stipulated to the admission of the exhibits
contained in the exhibit binder with exhibits marked 1 through 15 representing the Petitioners' exhibits
and exhibits 1 through 9 representing the Respondent's exhibits. The Commission admitted the exhibits
into evidence.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the exhibits as stipulated
by the parties, and incorporating the proposed finds submitted by the parties the Tax Commission hereby
makes its:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioners are appealing audit deficiency of Utah individual income tax issued for the tax

year 2001. The Division issued on October 23, 2005, a Statutory Notice of Estimated Income Tax to the
Mandells showing a deficiency in Utah state income tax for 2001 of $70,129.62, penalties of $14,025,92
and interest of $6,148 as of the date of the assessment. (See Respondent's Exhibit 1, "Statutory Notice".)
2.

The Mandells did not file a Utah state income tax return for the tax year 2001. They

were not residents of the state of Utah for purposes of income tax for the year 2001.
3.

The deficiency represented by the Statutory Notice related to a $1,127,977.00 payment

made to the Mandells as settlement of a lawsuit they had filed in the Second Judicial District Court of the
State of Nevada against the estate of Eugene Whitworth. The lawsuit involved the actions of Mr.
Whitworth during the negotiations and completion of the sale of Homes America of Utah, Inc. ("HAU")
to Champion Homes, inc. ("Champion"). (See Respondent's Exhibits 1,3,4 & 5.)
4.

The sale of HAU to Champion occurred in 1998. (See Respondent's Exhibit 6.)

5.

The Mandells were residents of the state of Utah when the sale of HAU to Champion

occurred.
6.

While Dennis Mandell was a shareholder of HAU, HAU was a Utah corporation doing

business in Utah that filed as a subchapter S corporation for federal income tax purposes.

(See

Respondent's Exhibit 6, ^ 3.13.2, "Stock Purchase Agreement.")
7.

HAU sold mobile homes in Utah under the brand "Homes America." (See Respondent's

Exhibit 5, p. 3, lines 18-20, "Motion for Summary Judgment'.)
8.

Mr. Mandell managed HAU from its date of incorporation and the Mandells were

residents of Utah from 1995 to March of 1999.
9.

HAU had three shareholders as follows: Mr. Mandell owned 20% of the stock, Gerald
-2-
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Meyer owned 20% and Eugene Wliitworth ("Whitworth") owned 60%. (See Respondent's Exhibit 1, p.
57.)
10.

Mr. Mandell testified that his management services for HAU were performed in

anticipation of an increase of the value of his stock interest in HAU.
11.

Mr. Wliitworth, in addition to his controlling interest in HAU, controlled eight other

corporations operating in states other than Utah, but in the same line of business as HAU. These
corporations consisted of Wliitworth Management, Inc., a Nevada corporation, Homes America of
Arizona, Inc., an Arizona corporation, American Transport, Inc., a Nevada corporation, USA Mobile
Homes, Inc., an Oregon corporation, Factory Homes Outlet, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Homes America
of Oklahoma, Inc., an Oklahoma corporation, Homes America of California, Inc., a California
corporation, Homes America Finance, Inc., a Nevada corporation. (See Respondent's Exhibit 6, "Stock
Purchase Agreement," p. 49.)
12.

In 1998, Champion entered into negotiations with Mr. Whitworth for the purchase of

HAU and the other eight corporations.
13.

Mr. Whitworth and Champion negotiated a total price for the nine corporations, including

HAU, of $102.5 million dollars. (See Respondent's Exhibit 5, "Motion for Summary Judgment," p.5.)
14.

As a condition of the purchase, Champion required that all corporations be part of the

acquisition. (See Respondent's Exhibit 5, p.4, Ins 22-23.)
15.

The purchase price included $67.5 million in cash, $5 million in cash held back for

eighteen months for unknown liabilities and $30 million in contingent payments based upon the
combined future earnings of the nine corporations. (See Respondent's Exhibit 5, p.5, Exhibit 6, 1 2.1.3.)
16.

The $67.5 million in cash and $5 million hold back was paid by Champion, but the $30

million dollar contingent payment remained an unrealized contingency. (See Respondent's Exhibit 5,
-3-
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17.

Mr. Whitworth allocated this purchase price to Hie nine corporations.

18.

Mr. Mandell summarized Whitworth's allocation of tlie purchase price as follows:

Wliitwortli never obtained an independent valuation of the nine corporations. The
allocation of purchase price for the nine corporations was simply established by
Wliitwortli stating what he wanted to pay each minority shareholder . . . . The result of
tlie Wliitwortli allocations was that approximately 90% of the purchase price or 96% of
tlie cash went to Wliitwortli. Corporations owned 100% by Whitworth received 80% to
100% allocated purchase price in cash. [HAU] received approximately 38% of tlie
Whitworth allocation of the purchase price in cash. Even though the 1997 audited
financial statements, the basis of the Champion transaction, established that tlie minority
interests were valued at over 20% of the total net 1997 income for the nine corporations,
Whitworth received $69,677,100.00 (96.11%) of the $72,500,000.00 cash portion of the
purchase price paid by Champion Homes while tlie minority shareholders received a total
of $2,822,900.00 (3.89%).
(See Respondent's Exhibit 5, p.5, In 25, p. 6, Ins. 1-3,11-21.)
19.

Mr. Whitworth directed that $8,105 million of the total $102.5 million purchase price be

allocated to HAU. (See Respondent's Exhibit 5, p.6, Ins. 4-10.)
20.

Mr. Wliitwortli directed that only 38% (or $3,105 Million) of tlie $8,105 Million

allocated to HAU be comprised of the cash portion of the purchase price with 62% (or $5 Million)
pertaining to the deferred portion of Hie purchase price never realized. (See Respondent's Exhibit 6.)
21.

Mr. Mandell's interest in the $8,105 million purchase price was $1,671 million. (See

Respondent's Exhibit 6.) However, tlie cash portion of tlie purchase price allocated to Mr. Mandell was
only $621,000.
22.

Mr. Mandell received the $621,000 cash portion of the purchase price of HAU when he

and tlie other shareholders consummated the sale to Champion Homes based upon these terms on March
27, 1998, concuiTently with the other Wliitwortli corporations. . (See Respondent's Exhibit 6, "Purchase
Agreement".) Mr. Mandell did not receive any of the deferred portions
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23.

Mr. Mandell and the other shareholders made an IRC § 338(h)(l0) election which caused

the sale to be deemed an asset sale of the property of HAU and subsequent liquidation of the sale
proceeds to the shareholders. (See Respondent's Exhibit 6,1f 3.13.11.)
24.

All of the shareholders in the other eight Whitworth corporations whose sale was also

included in the transactions executed a Section 338(h)(10) election. (Respondent's Exhibit 8.)
25.

HAU and the other corporations stepped up the basis of their assets as a result of the sale

and IRC § 338(h)(10) election. (See Respondent's Exhibit 7.)
26.

HAU reported Utah as its "commercial domicile" on its 1998 Utah income tax return.

(See Respondent's Exhibit 7, p.2, In 3.)
27.

HAU reported on its Utah income tax return as business income the gain it received on its

§ 338(h)(10) deemed sale of assets to Champion. (See Respondent's Exhibit 7, "HAU 1998 TC-20S",
Schedule A, In. 5.b.)
28.

HAU reported a 100% business income apportionment fraction to Utah on its 1998 Utah

income tax return. (See Respondent's Exhibit 7, "HAU 1998 TC-20S", Schedule A, In. 6.)
29.

Mr. Whitworth died in 1998. (See Respondent's Exhibit 4, p. 4, f 22.)

30.

The Mandells changed their domicile and permanently moved to the state of Nevada in

1999. For the tax year in question, 2001, they were no longer Utah resident individuals for state mcome
tax purposes.
31.

After Whitworth's death, Mr. Mandell learned that Mr. Whitworth had not fairly

allocated the purchase price from Champion Homes and the cash portion of the purchase price to HAU.
In 2000, Mandell filed a Complaint in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, County
Washau, against the Estate of Whitworth et al (CV0002977). (See Respondent's Exhibit 4.)
32.

The Complaint contained the following allegations.
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"[Mandell" [has] discovered that the allocations of the purchase price affixed by Whitworth for
each corporation were not based upon tlie actual values of each corporation compared to the total
purchase price offered by Champion Homes Center, Inc. Instead, Whitworth's allocation inflated
the values of those companies that he exclusively owned or where he had a large percentage of
ownership. These allocations decreased the true value of [MandelPs] ownership in [HAU].
(See Respondent's Exhibit 4,1J19.)
33.

The Complaint further alleged,

Whitworth also allocated a substantially larger percentage of the cash proceeds of the purchase
price to himself as compared to the cash paid to [Mandell]. [Mandell was] left relying upon
achieving the uncertain performance criteria for Hie bulk of [his] allocated purchase price. On
information and belief, Whitworth has transferred and assigned to die Gene Whitworth Trust
payments of money, effects and other value things, received by Whitworth as a result of his
disproportion allocation of purchase price and cash payments to the Homes America Sale.
(See Respondent's Exliibit 4, ^ 20 and 21.)
34.

The damages requested in the Complaint consisted of a constructive trust upon the

proceeds received by Mr. Whitworth which were disproportionate and which should have been paid to
Mr. Mandell. (See Respondent's Exhibit 4, p.9.)
35.

Mr. Mandell settled die Complaint in 2001 and reported a taxable gain from such

settlement of $1,127,977. The confidential Settlement Agreement released and discharged any claim
alleged in the Compliant. (See Respondent's Exliibit 3.) As a result of the settlement of the complaint an
additional payment of $1,127,977, this brought the total payment to Mr. Mandell to approximately $1.75
million. Tlie original allocation set forth in tlie purchase agreement had been $1,671 million. (See
Respondent's Exhibits 2 and 6.)
36.

Kenneth Stieha prepared the Mandells' 2001 federal income tax return, and he testified

that regardless of the nature of the claim, the damages related to MandelPs interest hi HAU should be
reported as a capital gain, not as ordinary income.
40.

Mr. Mandell reported his share of the additional sale proceeds received under the
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settlement on his federal 2001 income tax return, Schedule D, Part II, as a long term capital gain on the
sale of his "20% stock interest of Homes America of Utah, Inc., sold on 9/15/01." (See Respondent's
Exhibit 2, p. 7.)
41.

The Estate of Whitworth took an IRC § 1341(a) claim of right credit on its 2001 1041

federal income tax return to offset the settlement precedes it paid to Mandell in 2001 against the income
previously recognized by Whitworth in 1998 from the original sale. (See Respondent's Exhibit 9.)
42. In 2001, the Estate of Whitworth attempted to file an amended 1998 Utah State Income Tax
Return reducing its Utah gain recognized from the sale of Whitworth's stock by the amount of the
settlement proceeds paid to Mandell in 2001. (See Respondent's Exhibit 9, "Estate of Whitworth's 2001
Amended Utah TC-40.")
APPLICABLE LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-702 (2000)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-116 (2000)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-117(1) (2000)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-117(2)(a)(d) (2000)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-118 (2000)
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-543 (2000)
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1.

The threshold issue before this Commission is whether the net settlement proceeds

received by Mandell in 2001 of $1,127,977.00 are subject to Utah State Income Tax. To make this
determination, we must first determine the character and nature of the settlement proceeds.

The

Commission agrees with Respondent that for tax purposes the character and nature of settlement or
litigation proceeds are determined by asking the question, "In lieu of what were the damages awarded?"
-7-
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See Pennzoil Company v. Department of Revenue, 33 P.3d 314, 317 (Or. 2001) (citations omitted) and
Hort v. Commission, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). The Commission concludes that the settlement proceeds
essentially represent the amount Mr. Mandell should have received for his HAU stock in 1998.
2.

As tlie amount of the litigation proceeds are in lieu of funds that Mr. Mandell should have

received at the time he was a Utah resident and had sold tlie stock in his Utah business, the funds are
taxable as Utah Source income pursuant to Utah Code Sees. 59-10-116,117 & 118.
3.

Tlie Commission has the authority to waive penalties upon a showing of reasonable cause

and finds sufficient cause to do so in this matter. Utah Code Sec. 59-1-401(11). Respondent had issued
against Petitioner both 10% failure to file penalties and 10% failure to pay penalties pursuant to Utah
Code Sec. 59-l-401(l)&(2).
ANALYSIS
This question before the Commission is whether the settlement proceeds paid to Mr.
Mandel are subject to Utah tax considering Mr. Mandell was no longer a Utah resident at the time the
lawsuit was filed or settled. The income relales back to Mr. Mendel's sale of stock of HAU in 1998 when
he was a Utah resident and tlie cause of action settled was to obtain a fair allocation of the purchase price
for Mr. Mandell. hi fact, upon receipt of tlie settlement funds in 2001, Mr. Mandell included them on his
federal tax return as a capital gain from the sale of the stock of HAU.
On tlie other hand Petitioner argues the fraud action was against Mr. Witworth who was
not a party to Hie stock agreement, but who had caused Mr. Mandell to enter into tlie stock purchase
agreement. As petitioner argues a "chose of action" is an intangible and the proceeds would be taxable to
the state of residence. In this case Nevada. Petitioner points out that Champion acquired 100%) of the
stock in HAU in 1998.
Upon review of the information and arguments in this matter, the Commission concludes
-8-
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Respondent is correct in that the way to determine whether the settlement income at issue is taxable is
determine the character and nature of the settlement proceeds. It is settled law that for tax purposes the
character and nature of settlement or litigation proceeds are determined by asking the question, "In lieu of
what were the damages awarded?" See Pennzoil 33 P.3d 314, 317 (Or. 2001) (citations omitted) and
Hortv. Commission. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
The evidence before the Commission is Mandell's Complaint filed against the Estate of
Wliitworth that gave rise to the settlement. Mandell alleged in the complaint the following:
On information or belief, Whitworth has transferred and assigned to the Gene Whitworth
Trust payments and money, effects and other valuable things, received by Whitworth as
result of this disproportion allocation purchase price and cash payments to the Homes
America sale.
(See Respondent's Exhibit 6, *$ 21.)
Considering the facts in this matter it is the position of the Commissioners that the
damages sought in the Mandells5 complaint and the related motion for summary judgment were based
upon the fact that Mr. Whitworth had received money from Champion that should have been paid to Mr.
Mandell arising from Champion's purchase of the HAU and the other eight entities stock.

This

conclusion is consistent with the testimony of Mandell's accountant and Mandell's 2001 federal income
tax return that reported the settlement proceeds as a capital gain.
The fact that Mandell recovered the proceeds from Champion through a lawsuit against
Whitworth does not alter our conclusion. In Pennzoil v. Department of Rev., 33 P.3d 314, (Or. 2001) and
Pennzoil v. Dept. of Rev., 15 Or. Tax 101 (Or. Tax Regular Div. 2000), the Oregon Supreme Court and
Tax Court were faced with a similar issue. There, Pennzoil was seeking damages against Texaco
resultmg from Texaco's tortious interference of Pennzoil's contract with Getty Oil. The Oregon Courts
were not concerned that Pennzoil received the litigation proceeds from Texaco, not Getty Oil. The
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Oregon tax court noted: "It is the same as if Pennzoil said to Texaco you stole our deal pay us what we
would have benefited. In the court's view it does not matter whether the contract was stolen, condemned
or interfered with or cancelled; the income realized from it by Pennzoil was income "arising from" that
contract," Pennzoil 15 Or.Tax 109. The Oregon Supreme Court similarly stated, "We conclude that
Pennzoil received the settlement proceeds in lieu of its agreement with Getty and tfiat agreement gave rise
to the disputed income." Pennzoil 33 P.3d at 317.
Having determined the nature and character of the settlement proceeds, we must
determine whether such proceeds are subject to Utah income tax. The Division offers three independent
basis for taxation: (i) the proceeds are Utah source income because they relate to a sale of Utah assets; (ii)
the proceeds are Utah source income under Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-117(l)(b) since they represent the
payment for services rendered in Utah; and (iii) the MandelPs right to the proceeds were fixed when they
were residents, and a subsequent change in domicile does not alter the taxability of the proceeds by Utah.
We must only find a basis under one of the above three alternatives to sustain the Division's Statutory
Notice of Deficiency and conclude that the proceeds are taxable to Utah as they pertain to the sale of Utah
assets.
The original HAU - Champion transaction involved an IRC § 338(h)(10) election. The IRC §
338(h)(10) resulted in the sale being treated for tax purposes as if HAU sold all of its assets to Champion
with a subsequent liquidation of the proceeds to the shareholders. As such, the gain on the sale of the
assets is reorganized by HAU.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-702(2)(b) requires that "a nonresident shareholder shall recognize
a portion of a S corporation's Utah taxable income derived from Utah sources... in accordance with Utah
Code Ann. § 5940-117 and Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-118." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-117(d) provides
that "A nonresident shareholder's distributive share of ordinary income, gain, loss and deduction from or
-10-
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connected with Utah sources shall be determined under Section 59-10-118." Section 59-10-118 provides
that the "business income" shall be apportioned to Utah and "non-business" income from intangible
sources allocated to the "commercial domicile."
HAU reported the gain recognized in 1998 as business income and it was apportioned all
to Utah. The allocated purchase price under the purchase agreement was $1,605,000. Because of
Whitworth's actions, Mandell received only $621,000 of this amount in 1998. Mandell received and
additional $1,127,977 from the settlement in 2001, for a total of $1,748,977.
The Commission is convinced that had Whitworth received the settlement proceeds in
1998 under the purchase agreement, that such proceeds would clearly have been Utah source income
under the statutes discussed above and finds that it makes no difference that the proceeds were paid in the
form of settlement as opposed to the original transaction. The proceeds reflect the reallocation of the
Champion sale proceeds from Whitworth and the other corporations controlled by Whitworth to HAU
consistent with the value of die assets sold. The reallocation does not alter the nature or source of the
purchase price.
Considering the issue of the failure to file and failure to pay penalties, although the
Commission concludes that the law in this matter is clear and that Petitioner should have filed and paid
Utah individual income taxes on the income at issue in 2001, this is a very complicated area of law and
certainly difficult for Petitioners to understand that they would need to file Utah returns on the income
when they were residents of Nevada at the time they had received the income. For this reason the
Commission finds sufficient reasonable cause for waiver of the penalties.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing the commission sustain the Division's Statutory Notice of Estimated
Income Tax as it pertains to the tax and interest. However, the Commission waives the penalties. It is so
ordered.
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION:

day of
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DATED this If)
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ABSENT
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R. Bruce Johnson
Commissioner

Pam Hendrickson
Commission Chair
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^almer DePaulis
Commissioner

Marc B. Johnsj
Commissionel

Notice of Appeal Rights and Payment Requirement: You have twenty (20) days after the date of tliis
order to file a Request for Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code
Sec. 63-46b-13. A Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of
law or fact. If you do not file a Request foi Reconsideration with the Commission, tliis order constitutes
final agency action. You have tliirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this
order in accordance with Utah Code Sec. 59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et seq. Failure to pay the balance
resulting from tliis order within tliirty (30) days from the date of tliis order may result in a late payment
penalty.
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EXHIBIT A

26U.S.C.§1341
§ 1341. Computation of tax where taxpayer restores substantial amount
held under claim of right.
(a) General rule. If~
(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior
taxable year (or years) because it appeared that the
taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such item;
(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it
was established after the close of such prior taxable year (or
years) that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to
such item or to a portion of such item; and
(3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $ 3,000, then
the tax imposed by this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] for
the taxable year shall be the lesser of the following:
(4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such
deduction; or
(5) an amount equal t o (A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such
deduction, minus
(B) the decrease in tax under this chapter [26 USCS §§
1 et seq.] (or the corresponding provisions of prior revenue
laws) for the prior taxable year (or years) which would result
solely from the exclusion of such item (or portion thereof)
from gross income for such prior taxable year (or years).
For purposes of paragraph (5)(B), the corresponding provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 shall be chapter 1 of such
code (other than subchapter E, relating to self-employment income)
and subchapter E of chapter 2 of such code.
(b) Special rules.
(1) If the decrease in tax ascertained under subsection
(a)(5)(B) exceeds the tax imposed by this chapter [26 USCS
§§ 1 et seq.] for the taxable year (computed without the
deduction) such excess shall be considered to be a payment
of tax on the last day prescribed by law for the payment of

tax for the taxable year, and shall be refunded or credited in
the same manner as if it were an overpayment for such
taxable year.
(2) Subsection (a) does not apply to any deduction allowable with
respect to an item which was included in gross income by reason of
the sale or other disposition of stock in trade of the taxpayer (or
other property of a kind which would properly have been included in
the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the prior
taxable year) or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. This
paragraph shall not apply if the deduction arises out of refunds or
repayments with respect to rates made by a regulated public utility
(as defined in section 7701(a)(33) [26 USCS § 7701(a)(33)] without
regard to the limitation contained in the last two sentences thereof)
if such refunds or repayments are required to be made by the
Government, political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
referred to in such section, or by an order of a court, or are made in
settlement of litigation or under threat or imminence of litigation.
(3) If the tax imposed by this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] for
the taxable year is the amount determined under subsection (a)(5),
then the deduction referred to in subsection (a)(2) shall not be
taken into account for any purpose of this subtitle [26 USCS §§ 1 et
seq.] other than this section.
(4) For purposes of determining whether paragraph (4) or
paragraph (5) of subsection (a) applies(A) in any case where the deduction referred to in
paragraph (4) of subsection (a) results in a net operating
loss, such loss shall, for purposes of computing the tax for
the taxable year under such paragraph (4), be carried back
to the same extent and in the same manner as is provided
under section 172 [26 USCS § 172]; and
(B) in any case where the exclusion referred to in
paragraph (5)(B) of subsection (a) results in a net operating
loss or capital loss for the prior taxable year (or years), such
loss shall, for purposes of computing the decrease in tax for
the prior taxable year (or years) under such paragraph
(5)(B), be carried back and carried over to the same extent
and in the same manner as is provided under section 172
[26 USCS § 172] or section 1212 [26 USCS § 1212], except
that no carryover beyond the taxable year shall be taken into
account.

(5) For purposes of this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], the net
operating loss described in paragraph (4)(A) of this subsection, or
the net operating loss or capital loss described in paragraph (4)(B)
of this subsection, as the case may be, shall (after the application
of paragraph (4) or (5)(B) of subsection (a) for the taxable year) be
taken into account under section 172 or 1212 [26 USCS § 172 or
1212] for taxable years after the taxable year to the same extent
and in the same manner as(A) a net operating loss sustained for the taxable year, if
paragraph (4) of subsection (a) applied, or
(B) a net operating loss or capital loss sustained for the prior
taxable year (or years), if paragraph (5)(B) of subsection (a)
applied.
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Criminal actions-Provisions concerning-Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ARTICLE I. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
USCS CONST. ART. I, § 8, CL 3
Sec. 8, CI 3. Power of Congress to regulate commerce.
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes;
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ARTICLE I. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
USCS CONST. ART. IV, §2
Sec. 2. Privileges and Immunities.
Privileges
1.
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
2.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the
executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
3.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

U. S. Const. Amend. 14:
Sec. 1. [Citizens of the United States.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives-Power to reduce apportionment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors
for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President
and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under
any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall
have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability.
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned-Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to
be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection
or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.

